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Abstract The sociology of religion literature recognizes secularization as an
uneven process complicated by individual and country-level variables. However,
considerably less attention has been given to how correlates of church attendance
vary across divergent settings within a single religious denomination. Employing
recent data from Belgium, Ireland, and Slovenia, we test whether the belief, ideo-
logical support for the church, and religious commitment correlates of religious
behaviour are similar across these Catholic countries and whether there are any
remaining country effects influencing church attendance. The results of ordered
logit regression models show, on the one hand, the correlates of church attendance
are basically the same across the three countries and, on the other, that country
effects remain even when controlling for the key explanatory variables and other
covariates. These empirical findings suggest the need to develop a more contextual-
based understandings of secularization, focusing on the influence of cultural factors
operative in nationally-specific settings.
Keywords Church attendance  Secularization  Catholic countries  Comparative 
Surveys
Introduction
While there is ample research in the sociology of religion literature about
secularization as an uneven process that is complicated by individual and country-
level variables (Gorski and Altinordu 2008; Swatos and Olson 2000), relatively few
studies have examined the correlates of church attendance across diverse settings
within a single religious denomination.
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Sociological studies of secularization involving the quantitative use of large-
scale social survey data tend to fall into three broad categories: large N, theory
construction studies (Norris and Inglehart 2004), moderately large N studies testing
a particular theory (Kelley and De Graaf 1997), and two or three country case
studies involving a comparative historical focus (Gautier 1997). The task of delving
deeper into the characteristics of national contexts is made difficult by the sheer
number of nations included in the first two kinds of investigations. The third
category involves putting forward a qualitative historical account of each country’s
development as a basis for understanding the factors influencing individual-level
religious identity, a research strategy that comes closest to the approach followed
here, with reference to the three Catholic countries of Belgium, Ireland, and
Slovenia.
These different studies, and the sociology of religion literature more broadly, rely
on different understandings of the concept of secularization. Indeed, secularization
has a wide variety of meanings ranging from declining levels of church attendance
and religious belief, to the diminution of institutional influence and religious
authority, through to the rise of secular perspectives in science, politics, education
and other areas of social life (Chaves 1994; Tschannen 1991; Gorski 2003). These
varying meanings imply that secularization operates at different levels of the social
structure from the individual level of analysis right up to the organizational and
societal levels (Dobbelaere 1999). Sociologists have sought to generalize the
empirical scope of these conceptual understandings, but religious change may be
too complex and historically contingent in unique regional settings, to allow for
such general application. In the present study, secularization is analyzed at the
individual-level and is understood to mean a reduction in religious service
attendance, commitment to religious beliefs, and confidence in church moral
position-taking among devotees.
We begin by providing a rationale for comparing the three countries and give a
brief historical background of each. To provide a conceptual framework for the
analysis we then introduce and elaborate upon the literature on the social correlates
of religious behavior and participation, focusing on belief, ideological support for
the church, and religious commitment correlates. Following this, the data and
measures as well as the characteristics of the country samples are described. The
theoretical framework motivates hypotheses about the specific influence of the three
correlates on church attendance and these are tested using an ordered logit
regression analysis. The conclusion summarizes the empirical and theoretical
contribution of the study.
Comparing the Three Countries
Comparative research on religion has usefully categorized wider Europe in
denominational terms by distinguishing between Catholic, Protestant, and mixed
countries (Martin 1978, 1994). Within the Catholic cluster, Belgium, Ireland, and
Slovenia were chosen as comparison countries because they represent traditionally
62 Rev Relig Res (2013) 55:61–80
123
Catholic countries but, at the same time, have quite different historical backgrounds
and experiences of Catholicism1 (see Table 1).
Belgium, Ireland, and Slovenia are all small European societies and economies,
Belgium is located at the core, Ireland at the periphery, and Slovenia at the eastern
border. Importantly they are all countries with historically strong Catholic
majorities and with a small proportion of their respective populations comprised
by non-Catholics and non-Christians. In the 2008 wave of the European Values
Survey (EVS), 89 % of the Belgian sample, 94 % of the Irish sample, and 93 % of
the Slovenian sample self-identified as Roman Catholics.
Belgium is an example of a stable continuous democracy but, compared to
Ireland, has a considerably longer history of independence going back to 1830
(Houtart 1970; Martin 1978; Fox 1982). Belgium belongs to the pillar category of
Catholicism (Dobbelaere 1995; Martin 1978). By pillarization is meant the
organization of societal institutions (schools, hospitals, political parties, media
etc.) based on (secular and religious) ideological interests. The Belgian case is
complicated by the fact of its bipolar regional division between a predominately
Dutch or Flemish-speaking Flanders region in the north and a predominately
French-speaking Walloon region in the south. This linguistic and regional
Table 1 Comparing the three Catholic countries, 1940–2012
Variable Belgium Ireland Slovenia
Modal type of catholicity Pillar Monopoly Suppression
Nature of secularizationa Spontaneous Spontaneous Enforced and
partial spontaneous
Major forces
of secularization
Modernization Modernization State repression and
partial modernization
Church-state nexus Co-operation Co-operation Partial conflict
Macro political historyb Continuous democracy Continuous democracy Regime change
a The differentiation between spontaneous and enforced secularization comes from Meulemann (2004)
b The distinction between continuous democracy and regime change comes from Fishman and Jones
(2007)
1 In this study, larger and better-known Catholic countries such as France, Italy, and Poland are passed
over. These cases are also suitable for comparison but owing to the relative neglect of smaller Catholic
countries in prior comparative research on Catholicism (Manuel et al. 2006; Gannon 1988) we chose to
investigate variation across these three regional settings. To cite two examples, a recent edited volume
investigating the relationship between religious and political authority in international Catholicism
(Manuel et al. 2006), included eleven case studies of national churches in the global church, and of these,
only three represented small Catholic countries. In Gannon’s earlier work, just two of seven case studies
representing European Catholicism consisted of a small Catholic country (Belgium and the Netherlands),
the remainder focusing on larger contexts (Gannon 1988). In addition, previous comparative work on
Catholicism tends to suffer from a ‘‘scaling up’’ problem, by focusing heavily on describing and
analyzing church-state interactions, with the result that somewhat less attention has been given to
accounting for variation in religious beliefs and practices or institutional strength, such as trends in the
Catholic workforce, across different national contexts. A further limitation of earlier studies of
Catholicism is that they tend to eschew the direct comparison of cases, a weakness we attempt to address
in this study.
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nationalism cleavage is overlaid with other social divisions including religion and
social class (Dobbelaere and Voye´ 1990; Martin 1978; Fox 1982).
From the 1960s, and owing mainly to increased modernization, Belgian
Catholicism weakened in terms of its institutional strength but also in terms of the
commitment of devotees. As in the Irish case, the church in Belgium experienced a
significant reduction in organizational recruitment in the post-Vatican II era. The
peak year of vocations to the diocesan priesthood in Belgium, 1949, was earlier than
in Ireland and the decline was underway well before Vatican II (Fishman and Jones
2007). Other indicators of Catholic commitment such as weekly church attendance
also declined especially in the 1967–1973 time period. Generational experiences
have exerted a strong influence on religious belonging, the drop off in church
attendance and other indicators of religiosity were more pronounced among young
people than older generations (Dobbelaere 1988; Fox 1982).
Turning to the Irish case, a strong historical linkage developed between national
and religious identity owing to a long history of religious persecution under English
colonization (Fahey 1992). The newly independent Irish state, created in 1921,
looked to the Catholic Church for symbolic legitimation and, in turn, afforded the
church an important role in social welfare provision and lent its support to Catholic
ethics. Catholicism in Ireland belongs to the monopoly category owing to the
church’s symbolic dominance, and virtual monopoly status concerning morality, in
Irish society (Inglis 1998).
As in Belgium, the post-Vatican II experience of the Catholic Church in Ireland
involved decline in Catholic vocations, and from a very high level. While the
decline in vocations to the diocesan priesthood took hold in the late 1950s, the peak
year was 1959 (Fishman and Jones 2007), it continued after Vatican II. This
suggests that while the council may not have been a direct causal factor in the
decline, by creating more equal clergy-laity relations it had the unintended
consequence of reducing the rewards, such as social status, associated with
becoming a member of the church’s male workforce and, hence, its appeal as an
organization to join (Stark and Finke 2000).
From the 1960s, Irish society underwent a process of modernization, which was
accompanied by increasing secularization. Church attendance levels2 after Vatican
II held up more strongly in Ireland than in Belgium and did not begin to go into
sharp decline, especially among the young sectors of the population, until the 1980s
and 1990s (Fahey 1992). Historically, church-state relations in the Irish case have
been characterized by close co-operation, but since the 1970s, government policies
have increasingly challenged the church’s moral agenda, in relation to divorce,
abortion, contraception and more recently, Catholic schooling and same-sex
marriage, and stoked church-state tensions (Keogh 2007).
Slovenia represents a Catholic country in Eastern Europe and has a long Catholic
tradition going back to its early Christianization in the sixth century (Cˇrnicˇ and
2 Some disagreement exists among scholars of Catholicism concerning the causes of the church
attendance decline (mainly in relation to the US case). Two prevalent explanations apart from the
influence of Vatican II are the impact of the 1968 Papal encyclical on birth control, Humanae Vitae
(Greeley 2004) and the interaction of the sexual revolution with the feminist movement and youth
subculture (Hoge 1986).
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Lesjak 2003; Dolenc 1994). As in Ireland, it had an historical experience of church
suppression during which a strong linkage was forged between religious identity and
national belonging. Because of its recent history of church suppression under
communism,3 Slovenia falls into the suppression category of Catholicism.
In the communist era (spanning the early 1940s to 1991), some state activities,
such as the funding of faith communities and the granting of autonomy in relation to
episcopal appointments, did not involve church suppression while others did and,
hence, church-state relations in Slovenia may be characterized in terms of partial
conflict (Vidic´ 1962; Cava 1997). The suppression that did take place took different
forms ranging from state appropriation of the church’s property assets and the
imprisonment of church personnel, to restrictions on religious education and the
breaking of diplomatic relations with the Holy See (Smrke and Rakar 2006; Ramet
2002). While this suppression of religious activity, or ‘‘enforced secularization’’
(Meulemann 1994, p. 49), played an important role in the country’s secularization,
in contrast to the two other cases, it is also the case that Slovenia underwent
considerable socio-economic modernization, industrialization, urbanization and
educational expansion, during and after its communist era (Dolenc 1994; Fiamengo
1972; Ramet 2002; Marko 1993; Ramet and Fink-Hafner 2006) and that this
‘‘spontaneous secularization’’ (Meulemann 1994, p. 49) also contributed to a decline
in religious vitality.
In the 1960s, the Catholic Church enjoyed a plentiful supply of male clergy
(Ramet 1985) and provided few opportunities for lay activism among the Catholic
faithful (Ramet 2002). After Vatican II, the church faced growing legitimacy
challenges and, in the 1970s and 1980s, church-state clashes arose in relation to
contentious issues such as the place of Marxism in school curricula, the state’s
human rights record, and discrimination against Catholics in government employ-
ment (Dragos 2009; Ramet 2002). After independence, political debate about the
role of religion in the public square continued to challenge the church’s legitimacy,
particularly in relation to the provision of Catholic schooling (Ramet 2002). New
callings to the Catholic female workforce began to go into decline in the 1940s, two
decades prior to Vatican II, but experienced some numerical growth in the 1960s,
and then began to decline again from the 1970s onwards (Bezjak 2012). Trends in
other indicators of religious commitment, such as belief in Christian concepts such
as a personal God and life after death, began to increase in Slovenia in the 1990s as
the country underwent regime change by moving away from communism toward
democratic politics and governance (Greeley 2003; Smrke 2008).
This schematic account of the quite diverging historical backgrounds of Belgium,
Ireland, and Slovenia suggest there are a number of good theoretical reasons for
expecting church attendance, a key precept of the Catholic Church, to vary across
the three regional settings of Catholicism. One reason relates to religious belief.
3 Communism refers to an ideology and a form of social, political and economic organization whose
‘negative’ characteristics include the rejection of liberal capitalistic models and the suppression of civil
society activity. It is also characterized by a virtual monopoly by the Communist Party of the state’s
economy and polity and the Party’s capillary power extending to all areas of social life. Slovenia’s
communist and socialist past differentiates it from other Eastern European societies, since Yugoslavia
threw off Soviet Union occupation and influence in 1948 (Bezjak 2012).
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Although the data used in this study lacks measures of specifically Catholic belief
orthodoxy and employs instead more general measures of Christian orthodoxy such
as belief in God, sin, and life after death, past research suggests that belief
orthodoxy in one religious tradition may be influenced by the numerical strength of
other religious groups in the national local environment (Stark 1998; Jelen and
Wilcox 1998). Specifically, in societies such as Belgium, with somewhat higher
levels of non-Catholics and non-Christians than in Ireland and Slovenia, the
presence of non-Christians may adversely influence the orthodoxy of Catholics by
weakening the truth claims of the Christian faith or, alternatively, by acting as a
source of group resistance to Christian identity, may bolster Catholics’ devotion to
general Christian beliefs.
Different experiences across the three samples in historic church-state interac-
tions represent a second reason for expecting variation in church attendance. In each
country the Catholic Church has played an important prophetic leadership role, in
Belgium in relation to the organization of pillar social organizations, in Ireland in
regard to political violence and the politics of the family, and in Slovenia in respect
of the communist state, but of the three countries, the church’s socio-political
critique has perhaps been strongest in Slovenia. One might expect this prophetic
leadership to contribute to a bolstering of the church’s standing among the general
populace in relation to responding to spiritual and social problems and needs.
A third reason for expecting variation in church attendance across the three
countries has to do with socio-economic conditions. Ireland and Belgium are
characterized by the highest levels of socio-economic and human development,
defined as the ability of members of the general populace to live fulfilling lives in
which their basis needs are met, while Slovenia has the lowest (United Nations
Development Programme 2011). This can impact religious behavior as prior
research suggests that levels of human development produce different levels of
‘‘existential security’’ which, in turn, leads to increases or decreases in religious
belief and practice (Norris and Inglehart 2004).
Theoretical Orientations and Research Hypotheses
The influence of three correlates of religious behavior-belief, ideological support for
the church, and religious commitment variables (Bibby and Brinkerhoff 1974;
Cornwall 1987) are investigated in this study, beginning first with belief.
Belief
Whether one is a religious believer or not is shaped by the social context and this
extends from one’s family, especially through the influence of parents, to the wider
national environment. Parents transmit their beliefs to the next generation by
teaching their children how to pray, by placing religious objects in the home, and by
attending church themselves. The religiosity of the local environment, the religious
(or secular) values of people in one’s social networks, for example, may augment or
diminish this family-level religious socialization (Kelley and De Graaf 1997).
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One consistent finding from the literature is that people who are believers are
more likely to practice their religion than those who are not believers (Aarts et al.
2008; Cornwall 1989; Bibby and Brinherhoff 1974). There is not a simple or
straightforward relationship between belief and practice, however, and some debate
exists about which comes first and the direction of causal influence. Some believers
attend church services and engage in religious practice such as prayer while others
engage in few, if any, religious activities. At the same time, some people who
participate in religious activities may not believe in all or some of the major beliefs
of their church or may believe in general Christian orthodoxy but not in the
orthodoxy of their specific faith tradition. In the case of Catholics, for example,
devotees may believe in generic Christian ideas concerning God and heaven but not
in distinctly Catholic beliefs concerning abortion, artificial contraception, weekly
Mass attendance, and the transubstantiation of the Eucharist during the Mass.
Usually, though, belief and practice go together at least to some degree.
Prior research also suggests that the relationship between belief and practice may
vary across different religious categories. For example, because of the more
individualistic orientation of Protestantism compared to Catholicism, Catholics
should be more likely than Protestants to attend church (Lu¨chau 2007). Lu¨chau
found a strong connection between belief and practice in his study of Denmark,
Germany and Italy but found that the expected weak relationship between church
attendance and Protestantism did not exist (Lu¨chau 2007). Highlighting potential
empirical vulnerabilities in Grace Davie’s oft-cited concept of believing without
belonging, Aarts and colleagues found that Christian belief at the individual-level is
not as out of sync with practice as is often assumed (Aarts et al. 2008).
We thus formulate and test Hypothesis 1: We hypothesize that the effect of
belief on church attendance will differ across the three countries in accordance
with variation in belief orthodoxy.
Ideological Support
Apart from belief, religious participation and belonging is also potentially shaped by
one’s ideological support of churches (Karpov 1999). People who have a high level
of confidence in churches and who feel that religious institutions provide an
important source of guidance to them about their everyday spiritual and moral lives
are more likely to be active religiously than people who do not. People’s confidence
in the church, in turn, is conditioned by church-state sentiments and relations in a
given society. In some societies, churches enjoy strong state support either in
ideological or material terms (or both) while in other societies church and state are
ideologically opposed (Need and Evans 2001). In the case of the latter, churches can
act as important vehicles for expressing opposition to state repression through the
symbolic resources, religious narratives motivating political action, for example, or
material resources, church buildings as meeting places for state dissidents, at their
disposal whereas in the former churches are less likely to take public stands
opposing state activity.
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Ideological support for churches also depends upon the extent to which people feel
they have credibility and legitimacy when it comes to taking public stands about
important social and moral issues of the day (Dillon 1996). Churches that are able to
legitimize their public political and moral claims-making by appealing to such things
as religious ethics, human rights codes, and national myths are more likely to exert
influence on public opinion. Churches that act in ways that are incongruent with these
bases of authority are more likely to lack widespread public legitimacy.
We thus formulate and test Hypothesis 2: We hypothesize that the effect of
ideological support on church attendance will differ across the three countries
in accordance with variation in church sociopolitical leadership.
Religious Commitment
A final explanation for religious behavior is religious commitment (Cornwall 1989).
This has to do with the salience or not of religion in one’s life and represents the
subjective, personal and affective element of religiosity. This is a variable that comes
between belief and behavior and helps explain why religious beliefs and behaviors
sometimes do not go together. One may believe in God but if this does not mean one
is committed to this belief, one is unlikely to engage in religious behaviors to validate
it. Certain social practices tend to flow, then, from strong levels of commitment to a
belief item that involves trade-offs or opportunity costs in relation to other behaviors.
But prior research further suggests that the meaning and social practice components
of religiosity go together, how active people are in their religious group tends to
strongly influence the salience of their faith (Roberts and Davidson 1984).
General socio-economic conditions also tend to exert a strong bearing on the
degree of one’s religious commitment though scholars disagree about the nature of
the relationship between life conditions and religious participation (Tabak and
Mickelson 2009). Some studies suggest that religiosity has a negative impact on
important life conditions, experiences and outcomes (Schnittker 2001) while a
larger body of research suggests it has a positive effect (Mooney 2009; Schieman
2010; Tabak and Mickelson 2009). In societies with poor socio-economic
conditions, people’s daily lives are often characterized by high levels of uncertainty,
instability or difficulty, or lack of ‘‘existential security’’ (Norris and Inglehart 2004),
and in these conditions religious commitment tends to be greater because
challenging life experiences and situations, ranging from material disadvantage
and mental distress to discrimination and the absence of a political and civil society
voice, tend to contribute to the bolstering of people’s commitment to their faith as
individuals draw on their religious identities to make sense of these difficult
situations. The content of religious narratives, the collective worship experience, the
physical setting of religious services, or the social ties devotees develop in them,
can all help people to do this (Mooney 2009; Schieman 2010; Tabak and Mickelson
2009).
We thus formulate and test Hypothesis 3: We hypothesize that the effect of
religious commitment on church attendance will differ across the three
countries in accordance with variation in socioeconomic conditions.
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Socio-demographic Controls
Because past research links a number of socio-demographic variables such as age,
gender, education, employment status, and political ideology to religious identity
(Roberts and Davidson 1984), we control for their influence on church attendance.
We included age squared in the models in order to test for curvilinear age effects.
Data, Variables and Measures
Sample
The individual-level data for this analysis come from the 2008 wave of the EVS.
The country sample sizes were variable: 1,509 for Belgium, 1,013 for Ireland and
1,366 for Slovenia, constituting a total sample of 3,888 respondents. Table 2 reports
the descriptive statistics for the variables and Table 3 summarizes all the variables
and their definitions. All the analyses were carried out in Stata.
Explanatory Variables
For the belief and church answers needs variables, we constructed an index of these
by creating a new variable representing the average of the number of domains each
respondent believed in or felt the church provided answers to.4 We reverse coded
the importance of religion and church attendance variables to make their
interpretation more intuitive.
Descriptive Characteristics of the Three Samples
The Irish sample is somewhat younger than the Belgian and Slovenian samples with
a mean age of 45.70 years. In all three countries, females represent a higher
proportion of the sample than males and being married is the most frequent marital
status. Irish respondents have more children than either Belgian or Slovenian
respondents with a mean number of children of 2.09 compared to 1.61 for Belgian
respondents and 1.48 for Slovenian respondents. Thirty-two per cent of the Belgian
sample and 31 % of the Irish sample have some higher education compared to 19 %
in the Slovenian sample. With respect to employment status, 53 % of the Belgian
sample is employed compared to 55 and 51 % of the Irish and Slovenian samples.
Slovenians report the lowest scores on the political ideology scale and a stronger
orientation towards left-wing ideology compared to the Belgian and Irish samples.
4 While the political claims-making of national hierarchies tends to preclude making specific
recommendations to government concerning public policy and instead operates at a more general level
as outlined in Catholic social teaching, through its various agencies serving the poor and needy, the
Catholic Church seeks to address, in a concrete way, current social problems. The church provides
answers to social problems indicator may thus be understood as an indirect measure of public support for
Catholic social activism.
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Overall, there are similarities and differences in the country samples in terms of
their socio-demographic characteristics.
Multivariate Analysis of Church Attendance
The two empirical questions guiding this paper are: (1) to what extent does the
effect of the three explanatory variables on church attendance differ across the three
countries, and; (2) to what extent do country differences in church attendance
remain that are not accounted for by the three explanatory variables and other
covariates? To answer the first question, we carried out a multivariate analysis in
which we estimate the influence of three explanatory variables on the dependent
variable separately in each country. To answer the second question, we pooled the
data from the three countries and included country as a covariate as well as
Table 2 Descriptive statistics of variables (st. dev. in parentheses) across the three samples
Variable Belgium Ireland Slovenia
Control variables
Age 46.99 (17.46) 45.70 (17.68) 48.53 (18.11)
Gender .48 (.49) .40 (.49) .45 (.49)
Marital status
Not married .39 (.48) .49 (.50) .39 (.48)
Children 1.61 (1.47) 2.09 (2.03) 1.48 (1.15)
Education
No formal education .02 (.14) .02 (.14) .03 (.18)
Some primary education .09 (.28) .14 (.34) .19 (.39)
Some secondary education .56 (.49) .52 (.49) .57 (.49)
Some higher education .32 (.46) .31 (.45) .19 (.39)
Employment status
Employed .53 (.49) .53 (.49) .51 (.49)
Not employed .46 (.49) .46 (.49) .48 (.49)
Political ideology 5.06 (1.88) 5.82 (1.89) 5.00 (2.00)
Explanatory variables
Belief .41 (.34) .75 (.32) .42 (.36)
Ideological support
Confidence in church 1.90 (1.23) 2.29 (.95) 2.07 (1.03)
Church answers needs .33 (.36) .46 (.40) .42 (.39)
Religious commitment
Comfort from religion .42 (.49) .75 (.43) .55 (.49)
Importance of religion 1.24 (.98) 1.86 (.98) 1.31 (.97)
Dependent variable
Church attendance 2.48 (1.83) 4.40 (2.00) 3.19 (1.94)
Source EVS 2008
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Table 3 Variables and definitions used in the analyses
Variable Definition
Control variables
Socio-demographic
Age In years
Gender 1 = men
Marital status 1 = married, 0 = not married
Children Number of
Education Highest level of education
0 = no education, 1 = some primary education, 2 = some secondary
education, 3 = some higher education
Employment status 1 = employed, 2 = not employed
Political ideology ‘‘In political matters, people talk of ‘the left’ and ‘the right’. How would you
place your views’’
Measured on scale: 1 = left, 10 = right
Explanatory variables
Belief
God Which, if any, of the following do you believe in? God, hell, sin, and life
after death
Hell 1 = yes, 0 = no
Sin
Life after death
Ideological support of the church
Confidence in
churches
‘‘I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one could you tell
me how much confidence you have in them’’ churches
Measured on scale: 0 = none at all, 3 = a great deal
Church answers
spiritual needs
‘‘Generally speaking, do you think the churches in your country are giving
adequate answers to people’s spiritual needs?’’
1 = yes, 0 = no
Church answers moral
problems
‘‘Generally speaking, do you think the churches in your country are giving
adequate answers to moral problems and needs of the individual?’’
1 = yes, 0 = no
Church answers social
problems
‘‘Generally speaking, do you think the churches in your country are giving
adequate answers to the social problems facing our country today?’’
1 = yes, 0 = no
Religious commitment
Comfort from religion Do you find that you get comfort and strength from religion or not?
1 = yes, 0 = no
Importance of religion How important is religion in your life?
Measured on scale: 0 = not at all important at all, 3 = very important
Dependent variable
Church attendance ‘‘Apart from weddings, funerals and christening, how often do you attend
religious services these days?’’
Measured on scale: 1 = never practically never, 7 = more than once a week
Source EVS 2008
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interaction terms. We also ran a model estimating the influence of the socio-
demographic control variables on the dependent variable (see Table 4).
Turning to the influence of the explanatory variables on church attendance (see
Table 4), and controlling for the influence of the socio-demographic variables, we
expected, as set forth in Hypothesis 1, that the influence of belief on church
attendance would vary among the three societies. Table 4 evaluates this hypothesis
by presenting ordered logit regression co-efficients for each country separately. As
Table 4 makes clear, belief has statistically significant (at the .001 level) and
positive effects in all three countries. This finding went against our expectations.
Hypothesis 2 predicted that the influence of ideological support of the church
should also vary across the samples. As with belief, the ideological support for the
church co-efficients were unexpectedly positive and significant in all three
countries.
Our third hypothesis predicted that the influence of religious commitment on
church attendance would differ across the three countries. A glance at Table 4
shows that the two measures of religious commitment reach a high level of
statistical significance (at the .001 level) with respect to all three cases but that the
importance of religion variable has a positive effect on church attendance and the
comfort from religion variable a negative effect. This does not provide support for
hypothesis 3. The negative co-efficient for the comfort from religion variable is
surprising and may be related to the moderately high correlation between the
variables (r = -.60), which can have the effect of pushing one variable to have the
opposite sign to the other.
It is likely though that there is some residual variation in church attendance that is
not captured by the variables included in the separate country models. To capture
these national effects we estimated pooled sample models, which included country
effects as well as interactions between country and the age covariate (see Table 5).
We included an interaction term for age as one might expect that older respondents
would show the hypothesized effects in Slovenia and because, as noted earlier, the
reduction in church attendance appears to have been more pronounced among the
young in Belgium and Ireland. The results for these models are presented in six
models beginning with country effects only followed one at a time by variables
representing each explanatory variable, and then adding interaction terms, first for
country with age and, then, for country with the explanatory variables. In these models
Slovenia is the comparison country. The results show a residual country effect and
that the covariates influence church attendance differently across the country samples.
Model 1 shows that compared to Slovenian respondents, Belgian respondents are
less likely to attend church and Irish respondents are more likely to attend church.
As variables are added one at a time, we notice that country effects are not
significantly reduced with the exception of Model 6 in the case of Belgium. Indeed,
the influence of Belgium, in comparison to Slovenia, tends to increase, especially in
Model 3. Models 3–5 add each of the explanatory variables one at a time and when
examined individually in these models each of the measures has statistically
significant effects.
There are also some differences in the way church attendance is influenced across
countries, even when controlling for the socio-demographic variables. To
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Table 4 Ordered logit models of church attendance across the three samples
Variable Belgium Ireland Slovenia
Control variables
Age -.02
(.01)
-.008
(.02)
.04*
(.02)
Age2 .00*
(.00)
.00
(.00)
-.00*
(.00)
Gender -.07*
(.10)
-.29*
(.14)
-.29*
(.11)
Not married -.39**
(.12)
-.38*
(.15)
.24
(.15)
Number of children .10*
(.04)
-.07*
(.04)
.26***
(.07)
Education
Some primary education .01
(.39)
-.34
(.68)
.41
(.38)
Some secondary education -.13
(.36)
-.64
(.67)
.17*
(.37)
Some higher education .32
(.41)
-.56
(.68)
-.18
(.39)
Employed -.28**
(.12)
-.02
(.16)
-.16
(.14)
Political ideology .16**
(.02)
.24**
(.04)
.31***
(.03)
Explanatory variables
Belief 1.11***
(.21)
1.37***
(.32)
1.23***
(.25)
Ideological support
Confidence in church .13*
(.05)
.19*
(.09)
.21**
(.07)
Church answers needs .80***
(.16)
1.34***
(.24)
.78***
(.20)
Religious commitment
Comfort from religion -.93***
(.14)
-1.20***
(.23)
-.66***
(.17)
Importance of religion .83***
(.08)
.64***
(.11)
1.01***
(.10)
Constant 1 1.35 .37 3.87
Constant 2 1.78 1.23 4.35
Constant 3 2.37 1.92 4.74
Constant 4 3.59 2.61 6.46
Constant 5 4.53 3.74 7.30
Constant 6 7.18 6.98 9.92
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investigate these differences we included interaction terms for age as well as for
country with each of the explanatory variables in our pooled models (see Model 6).
We found that while age has basically no influence in Slovenia (co-efficient of
-.00), it reduces the likelihood of church attendance in Ireland by a small amount
(interaction effect of -.05). Compared to Slovenia, belief, ideological support of the
church, and religious commitment have a significantly stronger influence on church
attendance in Belgium and Ireland.
When we included interactions for country with the explanatory variables we
found that the subjective importance of religion increases church attendance in
Ireland compared to Slovenia. In Slovenia, importance of religion increases church
attendance (co-efficient of 1.01) but it reduces the likelihood of church attendance in
Ireland by a significant amount (interaction effect of -.38). These remaining
country differences may reflect the influence of early religious socialization in
Catholic schools or other cultural influences operative in different national settings.
This study’s unexpected findings in relation to the research hypotheses set forth
earlier, warrants further discussion. In all three countries belief has a statistically
significant and positive effect on church attendance. One possible explanation for
the relatively uniform effects of belief relates to the presence of non-Christian
adherents. Regardless of the numerical size of the non-Christian population in the
three regional settings, the presence of even some non-Christians in the national
local environment may operate as an opposing identity category against which
Christian commitment among Catholics is defined, and thus may help to augment
the adherence of devotees to generic Christian ideas of God, sin, and life after death.
Second, features of Catholic theology and practice help explain the absence of
variation in the influence of the ideological support variable on church attendance.
Catholicism’s strong emphasis on the integration of ‘‘faith and morals’’, following
church teachings on personal morality, with ‘‘social action’’, focusing on the
application of the church’s body of social teachings to worldly affairs, encourages
devotees to realize the faith-life linkage. It may be that whether this claims-making
by the Catholic Church takes place in the context of co-operative or conflictual
church-state interactions has less of a bearing on devotees’ religious behavior than
the fact that the church is actually willing at all to speak out, and take public
positions, on important social and moral questions.
Table 4 continued
Variable Belgium Ireland Slovenia
Log-likelihood -1,641.3563 -758.66491 -1,166.0252
R2 .19 .23 .21
N 1,380 570 886
Note table figures are regression co-efficients with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable
is the frequency of church attendance among individuals in the general population in each country
Source EVS 2008
* p \ .05, ** p \ .01, *** p \ .001
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Table 5 Pooled sample ordered logit hierarchical models of church attendance
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Country (comp = Slovenia)
Belgium -.69***
(.06)
-.71***
(.07)
-.84***
(.08)
-.75***
(.08)
-.75***
(.08)
16.29
(10.20)
Ireland 1.13***
(.07)
1.08***
(.09)
.29**
(.10)
.54***
(.10)
.51***
(.11)
105.81***
(12.90)
Age .00
(.01)
.02
(.01)
.02*
(.01)
.01
(.01)
-.00
(.00)
Age2 .00
(.00)
-.00
(.00)
-.00
(.00)
-.00
(.00)
-.00
(.00)
Gender -.19**
(.06)
.10
(.07)
-.12
(.07)
.07
(.07)
.07
(.07)
Not married -.21**
(.07)
-.17*
(.08)
-.13
(.08)
-.12
(.09)
-.16
(.09)
Number of children .06**
(.02)
.02
(.02)
.01
(.02)
.01
(.03)
-.01
(.06)
Some primary education .12
(.25)
.25
(.26)
.40
(.26)
.42
(.28)
.34
(.28)
Some secondary education -.18
(.24)
.06
(.24)
.25
(.25)
.39
(.27)
.36
(.27)
Some higher education -.09
(.24)
.20
(.25)
.43
(.26)
.56*
(.28)
.59*
(.28)
Employment -.13
(.08)
-.05
(.08)
-.01
(.08)
.04
(.09)
-.00
(.09)
Political Ideology .24***
(.01)
.18***
(.01)
.16***
(.01)
.13***
(.02)
.13***
(.02)
Belief 3.00***
(.11)
2.34***
(.12)
1.16***
(.14)
1.17***
(.24)
Confidence in church .25***
(.03)
.19***
(.04)
.22**
(.07)
Church answers needs 1.48***
(.10)
.93***
(.11)
.77***
(.19)
Comfort from religion -.86***
(.09)
-.66***
(.17)
Importance of religion .85***
(.05)
1.01***
(.09)
Age* Belgium -.00
(.00)
Age* Ireland -.05***
(.00)
Belief* Belgium .02
(.32)
Confidence* Belgium -.08
(.09)
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Third, the similarity in the influence of the importance of religion measure across
the three cases suggests that because ethnicity is an important component of
religious identity in each context (Martin 1978), though more so in Ireland and
Slovenia owing to specific ethno-religious conflicts in each society, this ethnic
Catholicity bolsters the commitment of respondents to their faith which, in turn,
motivates them to attend church as an expression of this ethno-religious
identification. This convergence between ethnic and religious identities may thus
confound the effects of variation in ‘‘existential security’’ and socio-economic
development noted by other scholars (Norris and Inglehart 2004) on church
attendance. At least for these three Catholic countries, this ‘‘existential security’’
effect does not straightforwardly apply. Consistent with earlier research (Wilcox
et al. 1993), this also suggests that students of religion would do well to consider the
importance of the influence of religious identity, whether one is an ethnic Catholic
Table 5 continued
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Church answers needs*
Belgium
.05
(.25)
Comfort from religion*
Belgium
-.26
(.22)
Importance of religion*
Belgium
-.17
(.12)
Belief* Ireland .18
(.40)
Confidence* Ireland -.02
(.12)
Church answers needs*
Ireland
.59
(.30)
Comfort from religion*
Ireland
-.48
(.28)
Importance of religion*
Ireland
-.38**
(.14)
Constant 1 -.60 .93 2.35 3.26 1.84 1.59
Constant 2 -.23 1.27 2.77 3.69 2.33 2.08
Constant 3 .09 1.64 3.22 4.16 2.86 2.61
Constant 4 .88 2.51 4.27 5.29 4.12 3.88
Constant 5 1.43 3.16 3.16 5.02 6.11 5.02
Constant 6 3.46 5.32 7.36 8.60 7.64 7.69
Log-likelihood -6,375.52 -4,821.06 -4,383.38 -4,042.31 -3,669.82 -3,622.82
R2 .04 .07 .15 .18 .23 .24
N 3,871 3,092 3,061 2,926 2,836 2,836
Note table figures are regression co-efficients with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is the
frequency of church attendance among individuals in the general population in each country
Source EVS 2008
* p \ .05, ** p \ .01, *** p \ .001
76 Rev Relig Res (2013) 55:61–80
123
or not, on church attendance rather than simply whether or not one nominally
belongs to a certain religious tradition, believes in its core teachings, or supports its
public positions.
With reference to the socio-demographic variables, the results in Table 4 show
that age squared has statistically significant effects on church attendance in Belgium
and Slovenia but not in Ireland. The curvilinear age effect in Belgium and Slovenia
is likely due to the constraints of ill-health on church attendance among older people
that make them less mobile, and physically able to attend church, as they age.
Gender and number of children have statistically significant effects on church
attendance in all three samples. Not married has statistically significant effects in
Belgium and Ireland but not Slovenia. Being employed has a statistically significant
effect on church attendance in Belgium only. The co-efficient for political ideology
is positive and highly significant in all three samples.
Conclusion
This study formulated hypotheses about the influence of three distinct social
correlates of church attendance and empirically tested these with reference to
individual-level data from three Catholic countries representing different modal
types of Catholicity.
As such, the study contributes to our sociological understanding of religiosity in
Europe in general, and Catholicism in particular, at both a theoretical and empirical
level. Empirically, by implementing an often-bypassed research strategy, this study
helps overcome shortcomings of other studies of secularization. Some prior research
correctly includes large numbers of country cases and formulates general theoretical
claims that are extended to many religions and countries (Norris and Inglehart 2004)
but an unfortunate limitation of this approach is that it typically excludes the use of
qualitative comparative historical data and misses an opportunity to specify and
attempt to answer more specific research questions relevant to a smaller pool of
countries and to particular religious denominations. Other research focuses on in-
depth single-country explorations in which contextual case study is possible but
cross-national comparison is lacking (Luzˇny´ and Navra´tilova´ 2001; Karpov 1999).
Studies involving a comparison of a few select countries can successfully avoid the
shortcomings of each of these approaches.
At a theoretical level, we expected that the influence of the explanatory variables
would vary across the country samples. However, we found that the factors which
lead to increases or decreases in church attendance are basically the same for all
three cases. The presence of some non-Christian adherents in the local national
environment, aspects of Catholic doctrine and practice, and the congruence of ethnic
and religious identities help explain these unexpected findings.
These conclusions should be interpreted, however, in light of two limitations.
Because we rely on cross-sectional data, we are unable to judge the temporal
sequencing of the social correlates and church attendance nor to assess the different
mechanisms of secularization operative in the three settings and how these may
change over time, an analysis requiring the use of longitudinal data. In addition, our
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dependent variable is based on self-reports of church attendance and prior research
suggests that this may be subject to measurement error (Chaves and Stephens 2003),
as people tend to over-report their religious behaviour. Viable alternative measures,
such as data from daily time-expenditure diaries, may be less prone to reporting
errors (Chaves and Stephens 2003).
Finally, the study of correlates of religious behavior is likely to continue to
warrant the attention of students of religion in the future. We argue for the need
to develop contextual-based interpretations of church attendance that are sensitive to
historical configurations in unique settings, as the remaining country effects found
in this study suggest important nationally-specific cultural factors, that are not
accounted for by the correlates of religious behavior, may be relevant to explaining
variation in church attendance. Given the importance of historical-contextual
analyses of Catholicism, future research could usefully investigate regional
variation in historic church-state interactions and how these potentially impact on
confidence in the church, and thus on church attendance, in these regions.
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